Abstract-We consider a communication problem in which a sender, Alice, wishes to communicate with a receiver, Bob, over a channel controlled by an adversarial jammer, James, who is myopic. Specifically, for blocklength n, the codeword X n transmitted by Alice is corrupted by James who must base his adversarial decisions (of which locations of X n to corrupt and how to corrupt them) on the non-causal observation Z n of X n obtained through a noisy memoryless channel. More specifically, our communication model may be described by two channels. A memoryless channel p Z|X from Alice to James, and an arbitrarily varying channel from Alice to Bob, p Y |X S governed by a state S n determined by James. In standard adversarial channels, the states S n may depend on the codeword X n , but in our setting S n depends non-causally only on James's view Z n . We present upper and lower bounds on the capacity of myopic channels. For a number of special cases of interest we show that our bounds are tight. We then extend our results to the setting of secure communication, in which we require that the transmitted message remains secret from James. For example, we show that if 1i) James may flip at most a p fraction of the bits communicated between Alice and Bob and 2) James views X n through a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability q, then once James is "sufficiently myopic" (in this case, when p < 0.5 and H(q) > H( p)), then the optimal communication rate is that of an adversary who is "blind" (that is, an adversary that does not have any knowledge of X n at all), which is 1− H( p) for standard communication, and H(q)− H( p) for secure communication. A similar phenomenon exists for more general models of communication.
Sufficiently Myopic Adversaries Are Blind over a noisy channel governed by a jammer James. To do so, she encodes U into a length-n vector X n and transmits it over the channel, resulting in the received word Y n . Two types of channel models that have seen significant attention over the last decades are the memoryless channel model, e.g., [1] in which the channel is governed by random noise jamming which is completely oblivious [2] (or "blind") of the message U being transmitted and the adversarial (omniscient) channel model, in which James is thought of as an adversarial entity who can maliciously design the error imposed to fit the specific codeword transmitted, [3] . While the capacity of the former model is well-understood, that of the latter encompasses numerous open problems in coding and information theory. This state of affairs has led to the study of several channel models that conceptually lie between the two extreme communication models -those in which the channel is oblivious of the transmitted codeword X n , and those in which the channel acts as an adversarial jammer who is aware of X n noncausally. These include arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs), e.g. [4] [5] [6] [7] , causal channels, e.g. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , and computationally limited channels, e.g. [16] .
Inspired by the study of Sarwate [17] , we consider here the model of myopic adversarial jammers. In the myopic setting, the jammer James is still a malicious entity that wishes to carefully design his error to corrupt communication; however, his view of the codeword X n is limited in the sense that it is masked through a noisy memoryless channel p Z |X . The output Z n of this channel is seen by James non-causally before he designs his jamming vector S n . If the channel between Alice and James is noiseless, the myopic model reduces to the standard omniscient adversarial model, if it is of zero rate, the myopic model captures the model of a "blind" adversary that has no knowledge of the codeword X n transmitted.
Formally, the myopic model is described (see Figure 1 ) by two channels: a memoryless channel p Z |X from Alice to James, and an AVC from Alice to Bob which is modeled by a state channel p Y |X S . Both the channels have the same input generated by Alice's encoder. The channel may have an input constraint on the transmitted codeword X n , and the vector of states S n is determined (possibly under a state constraint) by James as a function of his masked non-causal view Z n of the transmitted codeword.
We study the capacity of myopic adversarial channels. We start by studying a binary myopic channel in which (i) James may flip at most a p fraction of the bits communicated between Alice and Bob, and (ii) James views X n through a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability 0018-9448 c 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. q (i.e., BSC(q)). Namely, in our notation, the Hamming weight of S n is at most pn, p Z |X (z|x) = q for z = x, and p Y |X S (y|x, s) = 1 iff y = x + s (and otherwise 0). We aim to characterize the capacity of the channel under varying values of q. When q = 0, namely when James has full knowledge of the codeword X n , the channel reduces to the omniscient adversarial channel, for which the capacity is a central open problem in coding theory and only upper and lower bounds on capacity are known [18] [19] [20] . When q = 1/2, namely when James is blind, it is shown in [2] , [6] that the capacity equals that of the channel in which James flips bits randomly, i.e. the BSC( p), which equals 1 − H ( p).
The focus of this work is in the study of intermediate values of q, assuming p < 0.5. In a nutshell, we present a dichotomous behavior of the channel. If James is "sufficiently myopic," the optimal communication rate is that of a blind James, namely 1 
− H ( p). Specifically, we show that an optimal rate of 1 − H ( p) is achievable as long as H (q) > H ( p).

If on the other hand H (q) < H ( p)
, then the deterministic capacity of the myopic channel equals that of the omniscient channel, 1 which is known to be bounded away from 1 − H ( p) for all p, and in fact equals 0 for all p > 1/4. We extend our results to the setting of secure communication in which one requires that the transmitted message remains secret from James, combining a jammer and an eavesdropper in a single entity. In this extended setting, we show a similar phenomena: as long as H (q) > H ( p) the capacity equals that obtained for blind adversaries ( 
which is H (q) − H ( p)).
We then turn to study the myopic model for a memoryless channel p Z |X connecting Alice and James, and a channel p Y |X S connecting Alice and Bob. For this general setting, we obtain upper and lower bounds on capacity, both in the standard setting of communication, and in that of secure communication. As an additional case study, we analyze the setting in which the channel to James is a binary erasure channel BEC(q), and James can erase up to a fraction p of the transmitted bits observed by Bob. For this special case, through a refinement of our arguments, we show that the capacity is 1 − p if q > p; and for q < p, the deterministic capacity is the same as that for an omniscient adversary. We also consider channels in which James can erase or flip some fractions of bits, while obtaining observations over an arbitrary binary input channel.
As mentioned above, the work most relevant to ours is that of Sarwate [17] , in which the myopic channel model is studied under the assumption that Alice and Bob hold shared randomness that is not known to James (i.e., under the assumption of randomized coding). In this setting, a singleletter characterization of the randomized coding capacity is obtained. As with our study, the results in [17] bridge between the randomized capacity when the adversary James is assumed to be blind and that when James has full knowledge of the codeword transmitted.
Although our study was inspired by, and builds on, that of [17] , it differs from it in two important aspects. Primarily, and most importantly, we study the case of deterministic codes for which there is no shared randomness between Alice and Bob. The study of deterministic codes introduces many challenges that do not exist in the case of randomized codes, and involves a new set of analytical tools. Secondly, we study the general case in which the codewords X n of Alice and the state space S n of James are constrained. Our enhanced setting was explicitly left open in [17] .
A model related to our work is the wiretap channel of type II with an active eavesdropper. Wiretap channel of type II (see [21] [22] [23] [24] ) are channels with an eavesdropper who can choose a subset of transmitted symbols to view, with a constraint on the subset. An active eavesdropper can, in addition, introduce noise in what is received by the legitimate receiver. Aggarwal et al. [25] consider a model with an adversary who can choose a fraction p of bits to observe and also erase these bits. They showed that any rate up to 1 − p − H (2 p) can be achieved. In our notation, their model has q = 1 − p fraction of erasures in James' channel. If James experiences random erasures, then Theorem III.11 guarantees a secrecy rate up to (1− p)− p = 1−2 p. However, in [25] James has the additional power of choosing which bits to observe. As a special case of Theorem III.14, we are able to achieve a higher rate 1−2 p on the model of [25] as well (see Remark V.5). Additional works that address the action of myopic adversaries include [26] , which considers the study of the wiretap channel of type II with an active eavesdropper that can flip bits. Theorem III.14 generalizes their main result to an active eavesdropper who can erase as well as flip bits. The work in [27] , studies a different model of active myopic adversaries in which there are two non-cooperating adversarial entities, the Eavesdropper and the Jammer. Also, [32] , [33] consider myopicity in the context of AWGN channels. For specific channels over sufficiently large alphabets on which the attacks are either additive (e.g., [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] , summarized in [40] ), or "overwrite" (e.g., [41] , [42] , summarized in [43] ), more is known; computationally efficient codes meeting information-theoretic bounds are known. See Table I for a summary of previous related work.
We also consider the setup in which the message is required to be secret from the adversary. Some related models are the compound and arbitrarily varying wiretap channels studied in a sequence of works by Boche 2 et al. [28] [29] [30] . In this model, there is an active jamming adversary and an eavesdropper. The jammer selects a wiretap-channel from a set of wiretap-channels. For arbitrarily varying wiretap channels (AVWTC), [44] gave a characterization of the capacity under state constraint. This model differs from our model significantly. Unlike in AVWTC, our model has the roles of the jammer and the eavesdropper combined as a single adversary. Consequently, while the jamming adversary of AVWTC does not know the transmission, the jammer in our model knows it partially from its observation. On the other hand, in AVWTC, the jammer partly controls the views of both the eavesdropper and the legitimate receiver. In contrast, in our model, the combined eavesdropper-jammer observes the transmission through a random channel.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section II we describe the notation and a precise model for the myopic setting. In Section III we state our main results which are also summarized in Table I . Our results are first presented for the special binary symmetric error case discussed above, and then in greater generality. We also discuss a refinement of the general arguments to an erasure-erasure channel, and other binary input channels with erasing and flipping adversary. Section IV presents the proof of the main result for the binary case. Section V presents the proof of the lower bound for the general model.
II. MODEL AND NOTATION
A. Notation
Lower case letters denote variables, and upper case letters denote random variables and random vectors. Upper case calligraphic letters denote sets. For a set A, its cardinality is denoted by |A|. We will use exp(x) to denote 2 x . H (X), H (X|Y ), and I (X; Y ) denote the entropy of X, conditional entropy of X given Y , and the mutual information between X and Y , respectively. The alphabet sets of X and Y are denoted by X and Y respectively. With small abuse of notation, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, H ( p) denotes the entropy of a Bernoulli random variable X with Pr(X = 1) = p. The probability mass function of a random variable X is denoted by p X , i.e., p X (x) := Pr(X = x). Similarly the conditional probability mass function of X given Y is denoted by P X |Y . With abuse of notation, the subscript is sometimes omitted when it is obvious.
The type or empirical distribution of a length-n vector x n is denoted by T x n , and is defined as
For two vectors x n , y n , their joint type is denoted by T x n ,y n and the corresponding conditional distribution is denoted by T y n |x n . The types that are typical with respect to the distribution of X are denoted and defined as
The message random variable is denoted by U and, for a given code, the codeword for message u is denoted by x n (u). For any subset of messages M ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , 2 n R }, we define the corresponding set of codewords as
The Hamming distance between two vectors x n , y n over the same alphabet is the number of components in which they differ and is denoted by d H (x n , y n ). We define, for any z n ∈ {0, 1} and natural number d, the ball and the shell
For a state-deterministic arbitrarily varying channel, the output Y is a function of the input X and the adversarial state S. We denote the output resulting from input x and state s for such a channel by s(x). Similarly, the length-n output resulting from an input vector x n and a state vector s n is denoted by s n (x n ). For a subset B ⊆ X n and B ⊆ Y n , we denote
If an event A n is defined for each natural number n, we say that A n holds with high probability (whp) if Pr(A n ) → 1 as n → ∞. For such a sequence of events, we sometimes omit the subscript and loosely refer to it as an event A and say that A holds whp.
B. Model
In general, a myopic channel is defined by its input alphabet X , output alphabet to James Z, state alphabet S, output alphabet to Bob Y, conditional probability distribution p Z |X for the channel connecting Alice and James, conditional probability distribution p Y |X S for the channel connecting Alice and Bob, the state constraint W, and the input constraint V. As mentioned before, subscripts in the distributions will be omitted when these are obvious. The three parties of the channel, Alice, Bob, and James are described below (see Figure 1) . 1) Alice's Encoder: Alice has a message U uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n R that she wants to transmit to Bob; R denotes the rate of her message, and n the block-length of Alice's transmissions. To effect this communication, Alice encodes her message using an encoder Enc : {0, 1} n R → X n to output a transmitted vector X n = Enc(u). We emphasize that Alice's encoder is deterministic. The encoder has to satisfy the constraint T Enc(u) ∈ V for all u ∈ {0, 1} n R , where V is a convex set of types over the alphabet X .
2) Channel From Alice to James: James observes the output of X n passing through the memoryless channel p Z |X . More precisely, James observes the output Z n produced from X n by the channel law
3) Channel From Alice to Bob: Bob observes the output Y n obtained through the memoryless channel p Y |X S with X n and S n as input from Alice and James respectively. More precisely, the channel law is given as (y|x, s) . James is allowed to use any stochastic jamming strategy p S n |Z n based on the knowledge of the encoding and decoding maps to maximize the average probability of error. The jamming strategy p S n |Z n has to satisfy the condition that 
where the maximization is over all p S n |Z n satisfying (1), and Pr(Y n = y n |X n = x n ) depends on the jamming strategy p S n |Z n as
Rate R is achievable over the myopic channel if for any ε > 0 there exists a block length n such that the average error in communication is at most ε. The channel capacity is the supremum of all achievable rates. 6) Secrecy: At times, we will study the secrecy (i.e., secure) capacity between Alice and Bob under a strong secrecy requirement. In this setting, in addition to correct decoding, we require that James's view Z n reveals negligible information about Alice's message U , namely that I (Z n ; U ) → 0 as n → ∞.
III. OUR RESULTS
The results are presented first for the special binary symmetric error myopic channel (Sec. III-A) discussed in the introduction, and then in greater generality (Sec. III-B). We also present refinements of our general results for a binary erasure-erasure model, and a more general binary AVC in 3 Notice that in the setting of deterministic code design the average error criteria is essential for the study of the myopic model (in which we assume that James bases his decisions on a corrupted view of X n ), as otherwise, in the study of maximum error, James may neglect Z n and focus his strategy on a single transmitted codeword, yielding the channel p(z|x) irrelevant to the study of capacity. This state of affairs does not hold once stochastic coding is considered. Connections exist between the study of deterministic codes under the average error criteria and stochastic codes under the maximum error criteria in the context of AVCs, e.g., [5] . In this work we focus on deterministic codes (which we prove are optimal for several of the settings we study). which James can erase and flip some fractions of transmitted bits in Subsection III-C and Subsection III-D, respectively. 4 
A. The Myopic Binary C(q, p) Channel
Our studies begin with the binary channel C(q, p) ( Fig. 2 ) characterized by the pair of parameters (q, p) in which (i) James views X n through a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability q (i.e., BSC(q)), and (ii) James may flip at most a fraction p of the bits communicated between Alice and Bob. Namely, in our notation, we set
and
, T S n ∈ W if and only if S n ≤ pn} where · denotes the Hamming weight). We first study the case
Theorem III.
The capacity of the binary myopic adversarial channel C(q, p) is 1 − H ( p) if p ≤ 1/2 and H ( p) < H (q),
and 0 for p > 0.5.
To prove Theorem III.1, we must present both an upper and a lower bound on capacity. The upper bound is relatively simple and follows from the fact that James may roughly mimic a memoryless BSC( p) (no matter what q is). Specifically, James can completely neglect his view Z n and choose a state vector uniformly at random among those with type (1 − p, p). The converse of the channel coding theorem shows that the rate in this case is bounded above by 1 − H ( p). Our main contribution in the study of C(q, p) is in the achievability part of Theorem III.1, in which we show that one can obtain rates arbitrarily close to 1 − H ( p) as long as H (q) > H ( p) and p < 0.5. A proof outline and the full proof are both given in Section IV.
We next study the case of H (q) < H ( p). Here, we show that the capacity equals that of the omniscient adversary.
Theorem III.2. For H (q) < H ( p), the deterministic coding capacity of the binary myopic adversarial channel C(q, p) is the same as that of the binary adversarial channel with an omniscient adversary.
Proof: We assume successful communication at rate R over C(q, p) and show that R is achievable in the omniscient channel model as well. Consider the code that allows communication at rate R. The same code must also allow communication at rate R over a BSC(q) since H (q) < H ( p) and thus James can roughly mimic BSC(q), just as described above in the converse to Theorem III.1. Since for such an adversarial action, Bob can still decode X n , this implies that James, who views X n through a BSC(q) is able to decode X n as well, implying, in turn, that James is actually omniscient.
We finally turn to study the context of secure communication. Here, we first consider the binary symmetric broadcast channel with independent BSCs to Bob and James with crossover probabilities p and q, respectively. It is well known [45] that the message transmission capacity to Bob under the secrecy condition is H (q) − H ( p). An achievability scheme in this case is to use a wiretap code of rate 1 − H ( p) that is partitioned into 2 n(H (q)−H ( p)) bins, one for each message. A message is encoded to a randomly chosen codeword from the respective bin.
In our channel C(q, p), for p < 0. 5 
and H (q) > H ( p), the secrecy capacity is also H (q) − H ( p).
The encoding can be done using a wiretap code as before. James learns negligible information about the message by the secrecy results in the random channel case discussed above. Since James is sufficiently myopic, by Theorem III.1, Bob can decode the message and the private randomness irrespective of James's strategy. So, we have
Theorem III.3. For p < 0.5 and H (q) > H ( p), the binary myopic channel C(q, p) has secrecy capacity H (q) − H ( p).
B. General Myopic Channels
We now present our results for general myopic models. We consider the setup in which James's channel is given by p Z |X , and his state S n is constrained to have a type in the set W. Our achievability scheme uses a random coding argument with a single letter distribution p X ∈ V. The distributions, p X and p Z |X give rise to a joint distribution p X Z and a marginal distribution p Z . Recall that W is the set of state types of S n that James may impose. Let W S|Z be the set of conditional distributions p S|Z that results in a marginal distribution p S in the set W. Namely, p S|Z is in W S|Z if and only if
We recall that p Y |X S (y|x, s) is given as part of the channel definition. Note that p X and p S|Z define a joint single letter distribution over random variables X, Z , S, Y defined by
We are now ready to present our results for the general model. We consider an arbitrary AVC given by p Y |X S . By the functional representation lemma [47, Page 626] , there exists a random variable W (representing channel randomness) that is independent of the channel inputs X, S such that the output Y can be represented by a deterministic function of (X, S, W ). Our first theorem below addresses achievability.
Theorem III.4. For a general channel p Y |X S , consider R for which there exists a p
Then R is achievable using deterministic codes.
Remark III.5 (State-deterministic channels). Suppose the channel p Y |X S is state-deterministic, that is, Y is a function of X, S. Then there is no channel randomness, that is, W is constant. Hence condition (c) in Theorem III.4 becomes
Our proof of Theorem III.4 is along similar lines as that of Theorem III.1, and is presented in Sec. V. The theorem guarantees the maximum rate I (X; Y ) (condition (a)) against an oblivious adversary with state constraint, provided the state constraint satisfies the two myopicity conditions (b) and (c).
Here condition (b) is natural and says that James's channel should be worse than Bob's channel, i.e., James's view should be less 'informative' than Bob's. This corresponds to the condition H (q) > H ( p) in the binary case in Theorem III.1. Though condition (c) also says something similar in nature, its exact form is not intuitive. It comes because of a technical requirement in the proof (see Remark V.5). However, it also captures the non-symmetrizability condition in the case of oblivious adversaries, as discussed below in Remark III.6. Remark III.6 (Oblivious adversary and symmetrizability). It is known that for an oblivious adversary, i.e., one without any knowledge of X n , the capacity of the AVC is 0 if the AVC is symmetrizable, and max p X min P S I (X; Y ) otherwise [6] . An AVC is said to be symmetrizable [6] if there exists a channel P S|X (with X ∈ X ) such that
for every x, x , y. We show in Appendix that for a symmetrizable AVC with an oblivious adversary, condition (c) in Theorem III. 4 
is violated. So, while condition (c) is stricter than necessary in general (see Sec. III-C), it is not completely redundant, as it captures the non-symmetrizability condition for achieving non-zero rates against oblivious adversaries.
We now give an upper bound obtained by considering only memoryless feasible jamming strategies. The proof follows from the study of memoryless AVCs, see e.g., [46] . 
Theorem III.7. A rate R is achievable only if there exists a
For the bit-flip channel C(q, p) with p < 0.5, Theorem III.1 characterizes the capacity for H (q) > H ( p), and Theorem III.2 states that the deterministic capacity is same as that of the omniscient adversary if H (q) < H ( p). On the contrary, for general channels, Theorem III.4 and Theorem III.7 do not give an equally clear answer. If for a certain p X , condition (b) in Theorem III.4 is violated, then the adversary can decode the message, and so he is omniscient. However, if condition (b) is satisfied, but condition (c) is violated, then the results do not throw any light on the capacity.
Using a similar argument as in the binary case (Theorem III.3), we obtain the following achievability result for secrecy rates.
Theorem III.8. For a channel p Y |X S , a secrecy rate R is achievable if there exists a p U,X with p
X ∈ V such that (a) ∀ p S|Z ∈ W S|Z : R < I (U ; Y ) − I (U ; Z ). (b) max p S|Z ∈W S|Z H (U |Y, S, W ) + max p S|Z ∈W S|Z H (Y |U ) < H (U |Z ).
C. Case Study: Binary Erasure-Erasure Channels
Communicating securely in the presence of an active eavesdropper has attracted some attention in the recent literature (e.g. [25] , [26] ). Hence, in this and the next subsection we comment on the implications of our techniques and results for some specific binary-input channels. While our results (Theorem III.4 and theorem III.7) for general channels are weaker than that for the bit-flip channels, for binary input error and erasure channels we will be able to give tighter results.
For an erasure-erasure channel (referred to as CE(q, p)) in which James's channel is a BEC(q), and he can erase at most a p fraction of the transmitted bits, Theorem III.4 guarantees rates up to 1 − p only if q > p + H ( p), whereas the upper bound of 1 − p in Theorem III.7 is valid whenever q > p. This gap can be eliminated by a careful analysis using specific properties of erasure channels. As a result, we have the capacity results as given below.
Theorem III.9. For q > p, the capacity of the binary erasureerasure channel CE(q, p) is 1 − p.
The proof of this result follows as a special case of (Theorem III.4) with a specific refinement of Lemma V.3 as discussed in Remark V.5. The 
then the capacity is
The proof is similar to the general myopic results, and the key element in the proof is outlined in Remark V.5.
2) Secrecy Capacity for Erasing and Flipping Adversary, CEF( p Z |X , p e , p w ): We now consider the secrecy capacity of CEF( p Z |X , p e , p w ), i.e., when James's channel is p Z |X , and the James can erase up to a fraction p e and flip up to a fraction p w of the transmitted bits. Using a randomly constructed code to encode the message and private randomness we obtain (see Remark V.5 for details) the following. , p e , p w ) . Here instead of James's channel being a random erasure channel, James can also choose a p r = 1 − q fraction of the transmitted bits to view/read, and he can erase up to a fraction p e and flip up to a fraction p w of the transmitted bits. This is a generalization of the models studied in [25] , [26] Theorem III.14 is of independent interest as it generalizes results on the wiretap channel of type II with active adversary [25] , [26] . Our general proof technique, together with the argument in Remark V.5, implies the result. As a special case, in the model WCEF-II( p, p, 0), James can observe up to a p fraction of bits of his choice and he can also erase a p fraction of bits. For a more restricted James (who has to erase the same bits that he observes), Aggarwal et al. [25] showed that rates up to 1 − p − H ( p) can be achieved. Theorem III.14 improves this to 1 − 2 p. As another special case, in the model WCEF-II( p r , 0, p w ), Theorem III.14 gives an achievable rate of 1 − p r − H ( p w ), which is same as the achievable rate in [26] .
It is also instructive to compare Theorem III.14 with results on Wiretap channel of type II (without any active adversary). A variation of Wiretap channel of type II was studied in [22] with multiple sources, where the eavesdropper can see some data symbols from one of the sources in addition to some transmitted symbols. [23] gave outer and inner bounds on rates achievable in a wiretap channel of type II, and [24] gave a characterization of the capacity. Here, the main channel (of Bob) is a random channel unlike our model where it is adversarial. When specialized to the binary error and erasure channel that erases each symbol with probability p e and flips an unerased symbol with probability p w , the capacity is at least as much as the achievable rate in Theorem III.14. This achievable rate is obtained from [24, Theorem 2] using X = U (the auxiliary random variable) with uniform distribution. However, Theorem III.14 applies also to an adversarial channel.
The capacity (under randomized encoding) of the AVWTC [44] , under type constrained state, is of the form
A difference between this result and our result (Theorem III.8) is the conditioning on S in the second term. This is because in an AVWTC model, the eavesdropper knows, in addition to Z , the state S introduced by the jammer. In our model, the combined jammer-eavesdropper produces the state vector as a function of its view Z n , possibly using additional independent randomness. So S n does not provide additional information to the eavesdropper over and above Z n .
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM III.1
The converse follows using the converse for BSC p (as discussed in Section III). We first present a sketch of the achievability in Subsection IV-A, and then in Subsection IV-B we give a formal proof. Our proof and notation is summarized in Figures 5 and 7 .
A. Proof Sketch for Theorem III.1
We now sketch the proof for the achievability of rates arbitrarily close to 1 − H ( p) over C(q, p) when p < 0.5 and H (q) > H ( p) (Theorem III.1). For a precise proof, and also for the precise definition of some of the ideas, we refer the reader to the technical proof appearing in Subsection IV-B.
The proof is based on a random coding argument showing that for rate R = 1 − H ( p) − for any > 0, with high probability, a randomly chosen codebook will achieve an exponentially small probability of error. Our code construction chooses all bits of all codewords i.i.d. ∼ Bernoulli(0.5). The decoder decodes for each received word y n its closest codeword x n . In what follows, many of the statements we make occur with high probability over code design (and not necessarily with probability 1) even though at times we do not state so explicitly.
Consider a codeword X n transmitted by Alice. James sees the output of his channel Z n , where about qn bits are flipped. In addition, we assume that an oracle tells James the Hamming distance D = X n − Z n between X n and Z n . This can only help James. We discuss the task of the oracle in detail later in the proof. James knows that the true codeword is at Hamming distance D from Z n . Since D is close to qn with high probability, there are approximately 2 n(H (q)−H ( p)) such codewords (Lemma IV.2). Our proof essentially makes use of this ambiguity from James' perspective that there are an exponential number of codewords that may have been transmitted. These consistent codewords (depicted in Figure 5 ) are exactly those that lie in a Hamming ball around Z n of radius D ≈ qn.
For every possible z n and d ≈ qn, the set of messages M s (z n , d) whose codewords are at a Hamming distance d from z n are partitioned a-priory into sets of size 2 nδ . We allow the oracle to also reveal to James, the identity of the partition of M s (Z n , D) containing the true encoded message. We refer to this set as the oracle-given set M og . James still has a reasonable amount of uncertainty about which of the 2 nδ codewords in M og was actually transmitted, which is sufficient for our analysis. Revealing D and M og to James only helps James, and allowing communication against this empowered James ensures the same for the original James. Restricting the uncertainty of James to M og is helpful in our specific analysis method. We show using a double list decoding argument that Fig. 5 . Relationship between important notation: Alice transmits X n , James observes Z n . The oracle informs James that Alice's transmission is one of M og = {X n , X n , X n , X n }, each of which is d ≈ qn away from Z n . James imposes the error vector S n , and Bob receives Y n = X n + S n . Bob decodes to the hopefully unique codeword in a ball of radius pn around Y n . In this example, the ball around X n + S n contains a codeword from C \ M og , and the ball around X n + S n contains a codewords from M og , and therefore if James imposes the error-vector S n an error may result in these cases. In our proof, we show that for any S n the fraction of X n ∈ M og whose decoding balls contain any other codewords is "very small". out of the given small exponential set M og of messages, only an exponentially small fraction will result in error for a specific choice of s n .
Conditioned on James' knowledge of Z n , D, M og , the message is uniformly distributed in M og . Let B(y n , d) denote the Hamming ball of radius d centered at y n . If x n is transmitted and s n is chosen by James, then a decoding error happens if there is another codeword x n consistent with the received vector x n + s n , that is, x n ∈ B(x n + s n , ( p + )n). We now argue that no matter what state vector s n James chooses, there will be at most an exponentially small fraction of messages in M og for which s n will cause a decoding error. We analyze two types of decoding error events, and through the analysis of these events we conclude our proof:
• (Lemma IV.5) there is a confusing codeword x n from [1 : 2 n R ] \ M og in the decoding ball.
• (Lemma IV.6) there is a confusing codeword from M og .
B. Achievability Proof of Theorem III.1
We now prove that any rate R < 1 − H ( p) can be achieved. Without loss of generality, we assume that R = 1−H ( p)− > 1 − H (q). We also assume, without loss of generality, that is sufficiently small.
Code construction: The code consists of 2 n R vectors X n (u); u = 1, 2, · · · , 2 n R , all selected independently with i.i.d. ∼ Bernoulli(1/2) components.
Encoding: Alice encodes message U with X n (U ) and transmits.
Decoding: Let the vector received by Bob be Y n . Bob constructs the list of messages that are consistent with Y n :
If L is a singleton {Û}, then Bob declaresÛ as the decoded message. Otherwise he declares error. Here 1 is a predetermined constant (that is set to be sufficiently small). We will say that a message u (resp. a codeword X n (u )) confuses another message u (resp. codeword X n (u)) under the state vector s n if
This means that if X n (u) is transmitted and James transmits s n , then the decoder finds X n (u ) consistent with the received vector Y n = X n (u) + s n . Clearly, in the binary setup under consideration, under any s n , X n (u) confuses X n (u ) iff X n (u ) confuses X n (u). We thus say X n (u) and X n (u ) confuse each other under s n . Let D denote the random variable d H (X n (U ), Z n ). Let 1 , 2 be sufficiently small constants. We define the following sets
and the events
The code satisfies E C1 with high probability according to Lemma IV.2 below. For every possible z n and d ∈ D, the set of messages
of size 2 nδ each, except possibly the last subset which may have a larger size < 2 · 2 nδ . Here
The constant δ is chosen to be small enough to satisfy some requirements to be mentioned later. This partitioning is done deterministically by taking the messages in order of their value, that is, satisfying u < u for each
d). Additional information to James from the oracle:
We assume that an oracle reveals to James some additional information and prove our achievability for this stronger adversary. The oracle reveals
We denote the sets
We make a few observations prior to our analysis. O. (z n , d) ), and X n (M s (z n , d) , D) c respectively. Since the codewords are chosen independently and uniformly at random from {0, 1} n , the conditional distribution of these codewords is also uniform in the respective sets.
First we give two standard lemmas showing that w.h.p., D has a typical value, satisfying the event E D (Lemma IV.1), and the spherical shell around Z n has a typical number of codewords, satisfying the event E C1 (Lemma IV.2).
Lemma IV.1. There exists h
Proof: The proof follows from standard typicality arguments. 
Lemma IV.2. There exists h
for large enough n. So for large enough n, clearly,
Thus by Chernoff bound and by taking the union bound over z n , d, we have
for a suitable h 2 ( 1 , 2 ). Let us fix z n , d satisfying |d − qn| ≤ n 1 , and s n ∈ F S . Let us now define an event E C2 (z n , d, s n , k) over the code construction that the k-th subset M
) has at most only 2 n(3δ/4) messages u which will suffer from decoding error for the respective realizations of
We will show in the subsequent analysis that the random code construction guarantees
for a positive constant c. Hence, with very high probability over the code construction, the code satisfies the good event E C1 ∩ E C2 . We will study such codes satisfying E C1 , E C2 . For such a code, the probability of error is bounded as
Here the first term follows from Lemma IV.1 by noting that E D depends on the noise realization in James's channel, and so it does not depend on the code events E C1 , E C2 . The second term follows from the definition of E C2 .
Hence once (4) is proved, it will imply that with high probability, the randomly generated code will have exponentially small probability of error as guaranteed by (5). This will complete the proof of Theorem III.1.
We now proceed to prove (4). First we note that,
C2 ) The first term is small by Lemma IV.2. For the second term,
. 'Confusion' graph under a given state vector s n ; (u, u ) is an edge if u is in the decoder's list when X n (u) is transmitted and s n is chosen by James.
In (a), we have used the fact that
Thus to show (4), it is sufficient to show that for some β > 0, for every M ∈ P M (d) and k ≤ 2 −nδ · |M|,
We now proceed to prove (6) . The messages in M which contribute to E c C2 (z n , d, s n ) are classified into two categories. Lemma IV.5 bounds the number of codewords which are decoded wrongly due to confusion with another codeword outside the same partition (revealed by the oracle). These codewords include those in the shell (but in another partition) as well as those outside the shell. Lemma IV.6 bounds the number of codewords which are decoded wrongly due to confusion with another codeword in the same partition that is revealed by the oracle.
First, we give a basic list-decoding result that will be used in Lemmas IV.5 and IV.6. 
The proof follows using standard arguments (see, e.g., [2, Lemma A.3 
]).
Corollary IV.4. With probability at least 1 − 2 −βn 2 , the code satisfies the property that in every Hamming sphere of radius ( p + 1 )n, there are at most cn 2 
codewords.
In what follows, for a given z n , d, s n , and k < λ(z n , d) we analyze the probability over the code construction that there are more than c 2 n 4 messages u ∈ M
Lemma IV.5. There exists β > 0 such that, for every z n , d ∈ D, s n ∈ F S , M ∈ P M , and k ≤ 2 −nδ ·|M|, conditioned on M s (z n , d) = M, with probability at least 1 − e −βn 2 , the following holds:
Proof: Our proof is depicted in Figure 7 . We note that
We first consider the codewords of
) when s n is chosen by James. To explain how this counting is done, let us consider the directed bipartitite graph (Fig. 6 ) with sides of nodes, M
There is an edge (u, u ) if u confuses u under s n . In this graph, we want to bound the number of left nodes (in M (k) og (z n , d)) with nonzero degree. This upper bound is obtained as the product of the number of right nodes with non-zero degree and the maximum degree of the right nodes.
Number of right nodes with non-zero degree: For every realization of
A right node u ∈ M c s (z n , d) has non-zero degree iff X n (u ) ∈ V. By Lemma IV.3, with probability at least 1 − e −βn 2 , there are at most cn 2 such nodes in M c s (z n , d).
Maximum degree of the right nodes:
Now consider a fixed realization of X n (M c s (z n , d)) and consider the uniform distribution of the codewords
By Corollary IV.4, with probability at least 1 − e −βn 2 over the choice of
Taking union bound over all u ∈ M c s (z n , d), this means that with probability at least 1 − e −βn 2 , the maximum degree of the right nodes is at most cn 2 .
Combining the above two steps, it follows that with probability at least 1 − e −βn 2 , there are at most c 2 n 4 messages in M
in the first step. We note that
and the number of messages in
. So, the expected number of these codewords in V is at most
The exponent is < 0 for small enough 2 , 1 , δ. 5 Thus the first step follows using the same arguments. The second step is the same as before. We now examine the probability that the decoder finds a wrong message from M 
Let us now define a graph with vertices A 2 , and there is an edge between X n (i, j ) and
that is, if the codeword X n (i, j ) is confusable under the error vector s n with X n (i , j ). We define the non-horizontal degree of a node as the number of edges between that node and another node in a different row. The non-vertical degree is similarly defined. Clearly the number of nodes with non-zero degree is bounded by the sum of the number of nodes with non-zero non-horizontal degree and the number of nodes with non-zero non-vertical degree. We will bound these numbers individually. Here we will make use of the independence of the codewords for different rows, and for different columns to show that with high probability this is a small fraction of |A| 2 for every s n .
Lemma IV.6. There exists β > 0 such that, for every z n , d ∈ D, s n ∈ F S , M ∈ P M , and k ≤ 2 −nδ ·|M|, conditioned on M s (z n , d) = M, with probability at least 1 − e −βn 2 , the following holds:
5 This is where we use the fact that δ is small. Reducing James' uncertainty with the help of the oracle is motivated by this step. 6 Note that this omits the global association of the codewords to the actual messages. To avoid this, we may further index these with (z n , d, k) . However, the same message may be indexed multiple times since it may be in M
That is, there are at most 2 n(3δ /4) 
We use the arrangement of the messages M (k) og (z n , d) in a square indexed by A × A as explained before the lemma. We start by noting that under the conditions of the lemma, with probability at least 1 − e −βn 2 , for every k < λ(z n , d) and every i ∈ A, there are at most c 2 n 4 codewords in the i -th row {X n (i, j )| j ∈ A} that are confused by a codeword in
i.e. in a different row. This follows using a two-step argument similar to the proof of Lemma IV.5, as the codewords of M (z n , d) . The same statement also follows for columns.
We have argued above that, with high probability over the code, there are at most c 2 n 4 codewords in any row (resp. column) which are confusable, under the error vector s n , with a codeword in another row (resp. column). Under this high probability event, there are at most c 2 n 4 |A| nodes with nonzero non-horizontal degree. Similarly there are at most c 2 n 4 |A| nodes with non-zero non-vertical degree. So there are at most 2c 2 n 4 |A| ≤ 2 n(3δ/4) nodes with non-zero degree.
Lemma IV.5 and IV.6 prove (6) for some β > 0, for
This in turn proves (4) . Thus with high probability, the code satisfies E C1 , E C2 . Such a code then achieves exponentially small probability of error by (5) . More specifically, based on James' knowledge (Z n , D, and the partition of messages), no matter what s n he chooses, the probability of error is small. Thus even if James uses a stochastic strategy -a conditional distribution of S n given his knowledge -the probability of error will still be exponentially small. This completes the achievability proof of Theorem III.1. For general pairs of channels (a channel p Z |X and the AVC p Y |X S ), the overall proof idea is the same. The joint type of two vectors now plays the role of the Hamming distance in the binary case. As before, we use a random coding argument. Let p X be the input distribution used to construct the code. We assume that it satisfies the condition in Theorem III.4. Recall that p Z |X is James' channel law. These give a joint distribution p X Z and a marginal distribution p Z . The channel law to Bob is given by p Y |X S . Note that if the jammer uses a i.i.d. jamming strategy p S|Z , then it gives a joint distribution p X p Z |X p S|Z p Y |X S . We define, for = |X ||Z| 1 , the Fig. 7 . Intuition about proof techniques: Fig (a) : Lemma IV.1 uses "standard" concentration inequalities to argue that the value of d (the amount of noise James sees) is "close" to qn. Lemma IV.2 argues that for every shell with such d, the number of codewords on a shell of radius d centred at z n is close to 2 n(H (q)−H ( p)) -from James's perspective, each of these codewords is equally likely to have been transmitted. Fig (b) : Lemmas IV.3 and Corollary IV.4 are "list-decoding" lemmas. Lemma IV.3 argues that regardless of the shape of the volume being considered, as long as it is smaller than the "average volume per codeword", for a super-exponentially large fraction of codes the number of codewords in the volume is not large (at most O(n 2 )). Lemma IV.5 then uses this result to show that for any s n , there are not too many codewords in M og confused with codewords in C \ M og (at most O(n 4 )). It does this in two steps -it first uses Lemma IV.3 to show that there are not too many "confuse-ing" codewords from C \ M og (e.g.X n andX n in the figure), and then it re-uses Lemma IV.3 to show that each "confuse-ing" codeword does not lead to too many "confus-ed" codewords (X n only confuses X n and X n in the figure) . Fig (c) : Lemma IV.6 analogously proves that for any fixed s n , there are not too many codewords in M og confused with other codewords in M og ". To do so, the 2 nδ codewords in M og are arranged in a square grid. Using Lemma IV.3 one can show that in any column (respectively row) of this grid there are not too many (at most O(n 2 )) codewords in that column (respectively row) that are confused due to s n with any other codeword in any other column (respectively row) -the red-arrows in the figure indicate codewords that are confused due to s n with another codeword in a different row or column. This allows one to demonstrate that the total fraction of codewords in M og that are confused by s n is an exponentially small fraction, and hence the probability of error is small. Since the preceding statements are true with probability super-exponentially close to 1, one may take a union bound over all possible values of d, z n , and s n . 
S|Z ) is defined, and it has a volume
Drawing similarity with the proofs for C(q, p), these sets take the role of balls of radius p around x n and y n respectively. Decoding: Let the vector received by Bob be Y n . Bob constructs the list of messages that are consistent with Y n :
If L is a singleton {Û}, then Bob declaresÛ as the decoded message. Otherwise he declares error. For a state-deterministic channel, we say that a message u (resp. a codeword X n (u )) confuses another message u (resp. codeword X n (u)) under the state vector s n if
This means that if X n (u) is transmitted and James transmits s n , then the decoder finds X n (u ) consistent with the received vector Y n = s n (X n (u)). The overall proof argument is the same as in the bit-flip case. So, in what follows, we only give the relevant modified lemmas and definitions in addition to any extra arguments which are required for the general case.
Let τ denote a joint type of x n , z n . Let us consider z n , τ , such that there exists at least one x n such that T x n ,z n = τ . For such a pair z n , τ , we define
Lemma V.1. The true codeword satisfies the decoding condition with high probability.
Proof: We first prove that the conditional type T S n |Z n ∈ W ( ) S|Z . By assumption, the adversary is constrained to use a state vector with a type T S n ∈ W. With high probability over the code, the codeword X n and Jammer's input Z n are jointly ( /|X ||Z|)-typical w.r.t. the distribution
and hence T S n |Z n ∈ W ( ) S|Z . Finally, by a refined Markov lemma [48] , (X n , Z n , S n , Y n ) is -typical w.r.t.
with high probability, for sufficiently large > . Then (X n , Y n ) is jointly 1 -typical w.r.t.
, where 1 = |S||Z| .
We now proceed to examine the error event due to another codeword satisfying the decoding criterion. We first prove for state-deterministic channels. For such channels, W is a constant and thus condition (c) in the theorem does not have W , as noted in Remark III.5.
Let T denote the type of (X n (U ), Z n ). Note that T is a random variable that takes values over the joint types of all possible vectors x n , z n . Recall that T μ (X, Z ) denotes (see Sec. II-A) the set of joint types which are μ-typical. Here μ = μ( 1 ) (it is a function of p X , p Z |X , though we do not mention it explicitly). We define the following sets,
where H τ (X|Z ) denotes the conditional entropy for the joint distribution τ . We define the events
For every z n and τ ∈ T μ (X, Z ), the oracle partitions the set of messages M s (z n , τ ) into disjoint subsets
of size 2 nδ , except possibly the last subset with larger size < 2 · 2 nδ . The partitions satisfy u < u
og (z n , τ ). The oracle reveals T (the type of (X n (U ), Z n )) and the particular subset 
are defined similarly as before:
We need to show the counterpart of (6):
for every M ∈ P M (τ ) and k ≤ 2 −nδ · |M|. The overall proof argument is the same as in the binary case. We now give the counterparts of Lemma IV.5 and Lemma IV.6 below in Lemma V.3 and Lemma V.4 respectively. Together, they imply (7). But first we give a generalization of Lemma IV.3: Lemma V.2. Let R, ν > 0, and N = 2 n R . Let A be a set and
Proof: The result follows in a similar way as Lemma IV.3 using the Chernoff bound. Lemma V.3. There exists β > 0 such that, for every z n , τ ∈ T μ (X, Z ), s n ∈ F S , M ∈ P M (τ ), and k ≤ 2 −nδ ·|M|, conditioned on M s (z n , τ ) = M, with probability at least 1 − e −βn 2 over the code, the following holds:
Note that the codewords of Sh(z n , τ ) . The codewords of M c s (z n , τ ) are distributed according to p n X conditioned on the subset (Sh(z n , τ ) ) c . We first prove the statement for codewords in M c s (z n , τ ). As in the proof of Lemma IV.5, we consider the bipartite confusability graph; and we have two key steps to count the number of left-nodes with non-zero degree in the bipartite confusion graph:
1. Number of right nodes with non-zero degree: For every realization of X n (M (k) og (z n , τ )), we consider
This satisfies
(1/n) log 2 |V| ≤ δ + f 1 ( 1 ) + max p S|Z ∈W
( ) S|Z H (X|Y ).
A right node u ∈ M c s (z n , τ ) has non-zero degree iff X n (u ) ∈ V. Since Sh(z n , τ ) contains only a subset of one type of x n , for large enough n, under the probability measure p n X , Pr(Sh(z n , τ )) ≤ 1/2. Thus by Lemma V.2(i), for the codeword X n (u ) of any message u ∈ M c s (z n , τ ), the probability of it being chosen from V is Pr(V|(Sh(z n , τ )) c )
Thus, by Lemma V.2, with probability at least 1 − e −cn 2 , there are at most cn 2 codewords from X n (M c s (z n , τ )) in V for sufficiently small δ, 1 . Here we have used the fact that
So the same statement is also true over the whole random code, that is, when X n (M (k) og (z n , τ )) is also chosen randomly. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we study the secure and standard capacity of adversarial myopic channels. For the bit-flipping adversarial channel C(q, p), for the binary erasure-erasure adversarial channel CE(q, p), and more generally for binary input channels where the adversary can both erase and flip some fractions of bits, we characterize these capacities as the capacity under random noise when the adversary's own channel is more noisy than the worst noise it can impose on Bob, in terms of mutual information. For these models, we also consider analogs of the wiretap channel of type II with active adversary. For general myopic channels, we prove similar achievability results under a stricter condition of myopicity. A tight characterization of capacity for general myopic channels is left open and subject of future work.
APPENDIX SYMMETRIZABILITY FOR OBLIVIOUS ADVERSARIES
In this section, we show that for a symmetrizable AVC with an oblivious adversary, condition (c) in Theorem III.4 is violated.
For an oblivious adversary, H (X|Z ) = H (X). So, the RHS of condition (c) is H (X). Now let us consider a symmetrizable AVC. Recall the definition of a symmetrizable AVC, given in Remark III.6 (originally from [6] ). There exists a P S|X such that (3) is satisfied. The adversary can generate a random variable X with distribution P X (x) = P X (x) ∀x ∈ X and generate S from X using P S|X . In effect, he uses the resulting state distribution = P Y |X (y|x).
We thus have, ∀y ∈ Y, x ∈ X , P X (x)P Y |X (y|x) = P X (x)P Y |X (y|x) i.e. P Y X (y, x) = P Y X (y, x). Thus condition (c) is violated.
Hence, H (Y |X) = H (Y |X
). We note that
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